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ENVIRONMENT

THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION AND THE
RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHFUL
ENVIRONMENT*
Deborah Beaumont Schmidt** and Robert J.
Thompson***
I.

INTRODUCTION* * * *

Montana is blessed with a rich and varied terrain that has attracted and shaped an equally rich and varied community of people. We cannot talk about Montana-her history, her character,
her environment, her constitution-without devoting considerable
attention to the mountains, the rivers, the plains, the forests, and,
of course, the skies that form the land within the politically established boundaries of the state. In turn, we must focus on the essential elements characterizing the people that inhabit Montana and
call this land home.
This year Montanans celebrate one hundred years of statehood. It is serendipitous that this centennial year brings a wealth
of anthologies full of the work of Montana writers.1 Many of Mon* This paper was presented as part of the Environment Panel at the Constitutional
Symposium '89, November 16, 1989. Members of the panel included Margery Brown,
moderator, Deborah Schmidt, John Burke, Louise Cross, Karl Englund, Tom France,
Donald MacIntyre, and John Thorson.
* * Executive Director, Montana Environmental Quality Council, Helena, Montana;
B.A., religion, Connecticut College, New London, Conn. 1970.
*** Attorney, Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, Helena,
Montana (formerly attorney with the Montana Environmental Quality Council, Helena,
Montana); B.S., University of Wisconsin (Eau Claire), 1972; M.A., geography, University of
Iowa, 1975; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1982.
**** The views expressed in this article are the authors' own and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Montana Environmental Quality Council or the Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences.
1. See, e.g., THE LAST BEST PLACE: A MONTANA ANTHOLOGY (W. Kittredge & A. Smith

ed. 1988);

MONTANA SPACES

(W. Kittredge ed. 1988) [hereinafter

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1990

MONTANA SPACES].

1

Montana Law Review, Vol. 51 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 12

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

tana's writers, who also have national reputations, have helped to
define and characterize the land and the people of Montana.
Pointing out how these writers have helped to shape Montana's
definition of itself, William Kittredge has noted that "Montana has
had a long run of luck with writers," '2 who each has placed his or
her own individual imprimatur on the state's self-identity. A sampling of these retrospective and prospective views of Montana offers a sound foundation for understanding what we are about today and what our constitution means. Why does the Montana
Constitution contain repeated references to the right to have and
the responsibility to ensure a clean and healthful environment for
present and future generations? What has been the effect of these
provisions? Have Montana's political institutions, and more fundamentally, Montana's people responded fully to these ringing declarations? What is the future of these mandates?
This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the contemporary environmental movement that began on Earth Day in 19703
and that also clearly shaped the environmental provisions of Montana's constitution. Both the environmental movement and the
Montana Constitution are nearly twenty years old-old enough to
be held at least somewhat accountable for their successes and failures. An examination of the conflicting values of Montanans that
underlie realization of the environmental goals and requirements
reflected in the Montana Constitution helps to evaluate these successes and failures. Again, one can best understand these values by
reading and hearing the stories of Montanans beginning with the
relatively unknown traditions of the twelve Indian tribes,4 following with Montana history classics, 5 and continuing on with the
lively and compelling literature collected in the centennial
anthologies.
The values and the history of Montanans inextricably form
the framework for the central references to the environment in the
Montana Constitution. The first statement affirming Montanans'
commitment to the environment occurs in the preamble to the
constitution. Although not commonly considered in evaluations of
the environmental provisions of the constitution, the preamble
2. Kittredge, Foreword to MONTANA SPACES, supra note 1, at xiii.
3. See Commoner, A Reporter at Large-The Environment, NEW YORKER (June 15,
1987).
4. The tribes are the Assiniboine, Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, Crow, Blackfeet, Flathead, Salish, Kalispell, Kootenai, Gros Ventre, Chippewa-Cree, and Pend d'Oreille.
5. A good sampling of Montana's history classics would include: HOWARD, MONTANA:
HIGH, WIDE AND HANDSOME (1943); MALONE & ROEDER, MONTANA: A HISTORY OF Two CENTURIES (1976); and TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON LAND (1959).
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demonstrates the preeminent concern for the environment, as represented by statements concerning the quality of life:
We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet beauty of
our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of our rolling plains, and desiring to improve the quality of life, equality of
opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty for this and future generations do ordain and establish this constitution.'
This stirring affirmation that prefaces our constitution gives such
significance to improving and maintaining the quality of life in
Montana that it emphasizes these goals even over such fundamental tenets as liberty and equality of opportunity.
Again similarly giving premiere importance to a healthful environment, the first key constitutional provision, the declaration of
rights, places the right to a clean and healthful environment ahead
of such rights as freedoms of religion, assembly, and speech. Article II, section 3 states that "all persons are born free and have
certain inalienable rights," which "include the right to a clean and
healthful environment."7
Finally, the constitutional convention delegates, and subsequently the people of Montana, devoted a full article to the environment and the state's natural resources.8 Section 1 of article IX
states that Montana "and each person shall maintain and improve
a clean and healthful environment. . . for present and future generations."9 Section 2 provides that "[a]ll lands disturbed by the
taking of natural resources shall be reclaimed" and points to the
checkered history of mining in Montana and some of the problems
caused by it. 10 Section 3 demonstrates the fundamental importance
of water to Montanans by affirming all existing rights to the beneficial use of water, and granting all waters within the state as property of the state for the use of its people." Lastly, section 4 encourages identification and protection of cultural resources,1 2 and
section 5, amended into the constitution in 1976, establishes the
13
coal severance tax trust fund.
Overlying and undergirding these fundamental and resounding
statements on the environment and natural resources are the cen6. MONT. CONST. preamble.
7. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
8. MONT. CONST. art. IX.
9. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
10. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
11. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
12. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
13. Sections 4 and 5 of article 9 were not central to environmental debate at the constitutional convention and are not discussed further in this article.
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tral and sometimes conflicting values of a rugged frontier individualism versus protection of the environment. Throughout history
and certainly into the present, Montanans have lived the results of
these conflicts and dichotomies in character and values. And to a
large extent, the land and the environment that is Montana produces these conflicts. Montanans are a fiercely independent lot,
hardy, self-sufficient, and desiring maximum personal freedom.
More often than not, this desire for maximum personal freedom
runs head-on into the concern for maintaining and improving the
beauty and quality of the environment that brings people to Montana and compels them to stay in this state, although earning a
living here almost always is difficult. The convention delegates' debates certainly evidenced the colliding values of individual freedom
versus the environment-a conflict that continues to impede the
full implementation of the constitutional mandates described earlier. This law review article will examine the outcomes of this tension. Not surprisingly, the results are mixed. While some significant progress has been made to control pollution and even to
improve Montana's environment, in certain more fundamental respects the people of Montana have failed to realize the individual
commitment necessary to fulfill the resounding promises of 1972.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DISCUSSION

In the late 1960s, promoters of a call for a constitutional convention cited the compelling need for stronger constitutional provisions to ensure environmental protection. 1 4 The Montana Consti-

tutional Convention Commission, which prepared background
materials for convention delegates, stressed the citizen's right to a
healthful environment as a priority issue. 15 Moreover, the problem
posed for convention delegates was indicative of forthcoming
debates:
That there is continuing degradation of the environment is
scarcely debated. The solutions proposed for the problem are
highly debatable, intensely political issues affecting all manner of
private interests-consumer as well as corporate-in an effort to
recast the mold of that elusive but crucial "public interest."1 6
The delegate proposals on environmental issues ranged from
14. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MONTANA, A BETTER CONSTITUTION FOR BETTER GovERNMENt 5 (1969).
15. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, Study No. 10-Bill of Rights
250 (1971).
16. Id. at 278.
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proposals to protect existing water rights to proposals emphasizing
the public's right to a quality environment. 17 Most of the proposals
were debated at length by the Committee on Natural Resources
and Agriculture and developed into committee proposals for consideration by all convention delegates. The floor debates on the
committee proposals provide helpful indications of the Montana
values and ethics at stake in the crafting of the constitutional provisions on the environment.
A.

The Article IX Provisions

As noted earlier, Article IX consists of five sections, four of
which were developed at the convention. The following analysis is
limited to the first three sections, which were the center of convention debate.
1. Article IX, section 1
Article IX, section 1 describes fundamental environmental improvement directives. Clause (1) of section 1 directs the state and
the people to "maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment for present and future generations.""8 Both the Natural
Resources and Agriculture Committee1 9 and the full convention
strongly supported this mandate, although debates occurred over
the need to attach adjectives to describe the desired environment. 0 The voice vote on this clause,2 1 after extended debate on
17. Delegate proposals addressing environmental concerns include the following: Delegate Proposal No. 1-Establishing Public Policy on Environmental Quality; Delegate Proposal No. 2-Providing for Water Rights; Delegate Proposal No. 12-Protecting the Environment; Delegate Proposal No. 20-Providing a Public Policy of a Quality Environment;
Delegate Proposal No. 21- Guaranteeing an Individual's Right to a Quality Environment;
Delegate Proposal No. 48-Providing for Water Rights; Delegate Proposal No. 83-Providing for Acquisition of Historic Sites; Delegate Proposal No. 96-Irrigation and Water
Rights; Delegate Proposal No. 114-Public Sightliness and Good Order; Delegate Proposal
No. 127-Providing for Water Rights; Delegate Proposal No. 132-Environmental Rights;
and Delegate Proposal No. 162- Environment as Public Trust. See generally Delegate Pro-

posals, reprinted in I MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
(1972)[hereinafter TRANSCRIPTS].
18. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1).

CONVENTION

TRANSCRIPTS

75-332

19. In fact, the Committee's minority report supported an additional and concluding
section to the article that would enable a Montana resident to undertake legal enforcement
proceedings against a government agency charged with environmental protection responsibilities. Natural Resource and Agriculture Committe: Minority Proposal, § 4, reprintedin II
TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 561.
20. Although the Natural Resources Committee did not include the phrase "clean and
healthful," the convention delegates, after considerable discussion, added the phrase in late
floor action. See V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1249-51.
21. Id. at 1251.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1990

5

Montana
Law Review, Vol.
51 [1990],
Iss. 2, Art. 12
REVIEW
LAW
MONTANA

[Vol. 51

amendments, is perhaps the strongest indication of the root support that existed for ensuring a clean and healthful environment
well into Montana's future.
Delegates drafted clauses (2) and (3) to ensure an affirmative
legislative role in accomplishing the duty described in clause (1).
Clause (2) requires the legislature to administer and implement
this fundamental duty. Again, the committee clearly supported
constitutional establishment of this duty and convention debate
did not address this potential issue. Instead, the debate centered
on whether a constitution needs to enumerate the details of implementation.2" Clause (3) adds an additional obligation requiring the
legislature to ensure that adequate remedies are available to protect the environmental life-support system and to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources. This duty
also was firmly supported by the committee and full convention,
a prior
even though some wording may have been derived from
23
proposal to establish a public trust in the environment.
Statements by Delegates C. Louise Cross, chairperson of the
committee and committee minority representative, and Charles B.
McNeil, committee member and committee majority representative, demonstrate that the disagreements were not on the fundamental duties imposed by section 1.24 Instead, their differences focused on the degree to which the article needed additional
provisions implementing those duties. Delegate McNeil summarized the majority position: "[T]he temptation to legislate in the
Constitution was resisted and confidence reposed in the
'25
Legislature.
Other disagreements occurred on provisions that are not now
included in section 1. In particular, delegates defeated proposals to
attach public-trust responsibilities and to add a public right-to-sue
provision.26 In regard to creating a constitutional public trust in
the environment, Delegate McNeil stated:
The majority [of the Natural Resources and Agriculture Commit22. See, e.g., IV TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1200.
23. Id. at 1201.
24. Id. at 1199-1200.
25. Id. at 1200.
26. For public-trust initiatives, see I TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 96, 308-09 (Delegate Proposals Nos. 12 and 162); and proposed amendment by Delegate Jerome J. Cate, IV
TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1214. For citizen right-to-sue initiatives, see I TRANSCRIPTS,
supra note 17, at 75, 96, 108, 308-09 (Delegate Proposals Nos. 1, 12, 21, and 162); and V
TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1229 (proposed amendment by Delegate Mae Nan Robinson), id. at 1241-42 (proposed amendment by Delegate Arlyne Reichert),; and id. at 1251
(proposed amendment by Delegate C. Louise Cross).
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tee] felt it unnecessary to have the state hold in trust all land,
including, of course, privately owned real property, for the benefit
of all the people of the state in order to accomplish the protection
of our environment. In addition, the majority felt it unwise to experiment by incorporating into the Constitution, a "public trust"
which was not clearly defined to the committee . ... .
On the convention floor, the resistance to a combined public
trust/citizen's right-to-sue-the-state amendment 2 included comments that such proposals are "a departure from our traditional
notions of private property"2 and would be "the last nail in the
coffin" for private property owners.8 0 These arguments prevailed,
with the amendment failing by a fifty-eight to thirty-four vote."1
Convention delegates, including the majority of the natural
resources committee, thought it unnecessary to establish a citizen's right to sue based on environmental degradation alone. For
example, Delegate McNeil said, "The [committee] majority concluded that Montana's present law providing for class action...
is adequate." 2 Delegate McNeil also reassured delegates that
clause (3) provides ample protection by requiring the legislature
to develop adequate remedies to ensure that the environment is
not degraded or unreasonably depleted." These arguments were
effective in persuading convention delegates to reject three citizen's suit amendments presented on the convention floor, although each failed by narrow margins.34
In summary, article IX, section 1 reflects a strong convention
commitment to a constitutional duty to protect the environment.
While the public-trust discussion suggested a desire for a stronger
statement of duty, the disagreements focused on whether constitutional tools (i.e., directives to the legislature, establishment of a
citizen's right to sue) should be specified to ensure the duty is
fulfilled.
27. IV TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1201.
28. The amendment, submitted by Delegate Cate, proposed substituting the following
language for what is now clause (1):
The State of Montana shall maintain and enhance a clean and healthful environment as a public trust. The sole beneficiary of the trust shall be the citizens of
Montana, who shall have the duty to maintain and enhance the trust and the
right to protect and enforce it by appropriate legal proceedings against the
trustees.
IV TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1214.
29. Id. at 1216 (statement of Delegate McNeil).
30. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1224 (statement of Delegate Brazier).
31. Id. at 1228.
32. IV TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1201.
33. Id.
34. For a list of those amendments see supra note 26. The amendments proposed by
Delegates Robinson, Reichert, and Cross failed by votes of 51-43, 47-43, and 46-44, respectively. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1241, 1246, 1254.
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Article IX, section 2

Article IX, section 2 documents the reaction of convention
delegates to effects of mining in Montana, particularly the strip
mining of coal in the eastern counties. 85 The section states that
"[a]ll lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be
reclaimed" and requires the legislature to set effective reclamation
requirements and standards.36 As opposed to section 1, some delegates questioned whether this section was needed at all. In debating an amendment offered by Delegate Delaney to delete the section entirely,3 7 the delegates argued that clause (3) of section 138
already addressed reclamation concerns and that the legislature
should address land reclamation, thus ensuring a dynamic balancing of interests with changing times.3 9 The amendment represented
a clear minority position, however, failing by a vote of sixty to
thirty-three. "° The section's broad applicability to all natural resources, including agricultural activity, hard-rock mining and strip
mining, also concerned some delegates.
The most-discussed aspect of this section concerned the level
to which reclamation should be undertaken. The Committee on
Natural Resources and Agriculture proposed that the land "be reclaimed to as good a condition or use as prior to the disturbance." 4 Several delegates were apprehensive that this requirement might in many instances be impossible to fulfill. Two
amendments added on the convention floor revised the section so
that the reclamation standard was to a beneficial and productive
use.4 3 But subsequent convention discussion documents that even
this standard concerned convention delegates. The eventual compromise, as depicted in the present language, requires the legislature to develop effective reclamation requirements and standards. 4
Subsections (2) and (3) were added by general election in
35. See, e.g., V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1276 (statement of Delegate Cross).
36. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2(3).
37. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1278.
38. Subsection (3) requires the legislature to provide adequate remedies to prevent
unreasonable depletion of natural resources. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(3).
39. See IV TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1278-79 (statements of Delegates Delaney
and Joyce).
40. Id. at 1291.
41. See, e.g., id. at 1279 (statement of Delegate Ask).
42. The text of the majority proposal is reprinted in II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at
552.
43. See V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1292 (amendment offered by Delegate Ask),
and id. at 1299 (amendment offered by Delegate Cate).
44. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1).
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1974."' These provisions create a constitutional trust funded by the
extraction of natural resources. The intended eventual use of the
trust money is not fully clear, although a 1989 Montana Supreme
the trust
Court decision indicated that interest proceeds from
46
could be used for a broad variety of state programs.
3. Article IX, section 3
Section 3 integrates Montana's traditional water right perspectives with concerns about preserving water for Montana's future.
The convention delegates acknowledged the fundamental importance of water several times and acted firmly to make major expansions to the existing constitutional law. Delegate McNeil indicated this as follows:
Your committee feels that water rights are of crucial importance
to the past history and future development of the State of Montana. For this reason, the committee feels justified in expanding
the present constitutional section, which relates solely to the use
of water, to include provisions for
the protection of the waters of
4
the state for use by its people. 7
Clause (1) recognizes and confirms all rights to beneficial uses
of water. As stated by Delegate Davis, "The whole purpose ... is
to establish . . .that all existing water rights are recognized and
confirmed-so no one will get any idea that we're trying to take
4
away any vested or existing rights. 8
Clause (2) has been preserved from the 1889 Constitution. 9 As
with the first clause, convention testimony indicates a desire to encourage certainty for property owners' water rights. Moreover, the
clause preserves years of interpretive case law. 0
Clause (3) was novel to many convention delegates because it
asserted state ownership of water within Montana for use of the
people. Some delegates were concerned about possible loss of prop45. The 1974 Legislature directed that the proposed constitutional amendments be
presented for public vote. 1974 Mont. Laws 117.
46. Butte-Silver Bow Local Gov't v. State, 235 Mont. 398, 768 P.2d 327 (1989).
47. V TRANSCIPTS, supra note 17, at 1301.
48. Id. at 1302.
49. The 1889 Constitution provided:
The use of all water now appropriated, or that may hereafter be appropriated for
sale, rental, distribution, or other beneficial use, and the right of way over the
lands of others, for all ditches, drains, flumes, canals, and aqueducts, necessarily
used in connection therewith, as well as the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing the same, shall held to be a public use.
MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 15.
50. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1301 (statement of Delegate McNeil).
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erty rights in water. However, such fears were calmed by discussion emphasizing that water would still be subject to appropriation
for beneficial use as provided by law and that such appropriations
would be protectable property rights.5 1
Delegates also focused on the need to protect Montana's interests from downstream states. Echoing the view of some delegates,
Delegate McNeil stated:
The value [the committee] foresee[s] is that, if the state can say it
owns the water, at least it can stand in court and in an adjudication with a downstream state or with the federal government and
say, "We own it, so therefore we've got a right to talk about it and
defend it.""2
What is now clause (4), requiring centralized records of water
rights, was adopted to help document Montana's water use against
downstream interests.5 3 Delegates voted to enact this clause despite concerns about vesting such responsibility with a state bureaucracy, 5" and despite a statement by at least one delegate who
felt that policies concerning record-keeping should be left to the
purview of the legislature. 5
As with article IX, section 1, the provisions and amendments
that failed provide interesting perspective on convention thinking.
One of the Natural Resources and Agriculture Committee's proposed provisions would have allowed appropriation rights for instream uses." The provision not only defined beneficial uses to include a variety of instream and diversionary uses but also specified
that a diversion is not required to obtain a water right for these
uses. The proposed provision also authorized the legislature to determine a method for establishing nondiversionary water rights
and their relative priorities. Some touted the provision as meeting
the needs of traditional agricultural interests by allowing recreationists to obtain a water right under terms specified by the legislature, thereby enabling Montana to defend more water from downHowever, the provision died after
stream water interests.5
extended discussion about possible dangers created for traditional
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1307.
53. Cf. id. at 1315 (statement of Delegate McNeil).
54. An amendment introduced by Delegate Grace C. Bates was added during floor
discussion that emphasized the importance of local records as well. See id. at 1350.
55. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1349 (statement of Delegate Berg).
56. Natural Resource and Agriculture Committe: Majority Proposal, § 4, reprinted in
II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 552-53.
57. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1312 (statement of Delegate McNeil).
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uses if recreational water rights were allowed.5 8
Another clause the Natural Resources and Agriculture Committee suggested was to give constitutional status for priority of
appropriation law, except to allow denial of appropriations when in
the public interest.5 First, the public interest language was rejected as a drafting mistake." Then, because the remaining language would make the provision a strict rule that could in some
instances be too severe, e" the provision failed on a voice vote.62
While the water-rights section did not achieve a clear balance
on private property right and public values, consensus on one common goal seemed apparent. As Delegate Davis expressed early in
the convention discussion: "I think the sense of this whole article
[sic] is to protect Montana water, to make a strong statement that
we own our water, and protect it for the future use of our state and
our people from downstream appropriation. s
B. Article II, section 3
In revising the 1889 constitutional declaration of rights, the
1972 convention added three new inalienable rights that related to
the environment, basic necessities, and health. 4 Significantly, the
very first right on the revised list of rights is the right to a clean
and healthful environment. Added as an amendment on the convention floor, the provision was offered as an appropriate balance
to the duty placed on the state and its citizens by the adoption of
article IX.6 5 After discussion emphasizing that the clause does not
provide an independent citizens' right to sue, 6 the amendment
passed by a seventy-nine to seven vote. 7
The convention added a concluding statement emphasizing
that the enjoyment of these inalienable rights also imposes corresponding responsibilities on all persons. As Bill of Rights Committee Delegate Monroe stated: "The committee felt that the inclusion of such a statement does not infringe or impair the rights
granted in the declaration of rights, but only accords a tone of re58. Id. at 1322-40.
59.

II

Natural Resource and Agriculture Committe: Majority Proposal,

TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 553.
60. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17,

61.
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

§ 5,

reprinted in

at 1347.

Id. at 1347-48 (statement of Delegate Swanberg).
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1309.
See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 17, at 1637.
Id. at 1638.
Id. at 1640.
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sponsibility in their exercise."68
Although enacted subsequent to article IX, this provision,
guaranteeing the right to a clean and healthful environment and
asserting corresponding responsibilities, perhaps more than any
other, establishes the foundation for Montana's constitutional environmental protections.
C.

Summary

The convention discussion confirms that Montana's constitutional provisions on the environment are designed, first and foremost, to ensure a clean and healthful environment for Montanans
now and into the future. However, the discussion also emphasizes
other concerns that Montanans have about private values, which
include the right to use Montana's resources reasonably and the
protection of user rights to Montana's most important resource-water. The resulting blend perhaps explains why Montana's post-constitutional developments display erratic efforts at
environmental protection.
III. POST-CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Since 1972 Montana has made several efforts to promote a
clean and healthful environment. Generally, however, such efforts
have given minimal attention to citizen duties beyond that of compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. Moreover, in
many instances, federal activities have spurred state efforts.
For example, the federal Clean Air Act, 9 the federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,0 the federal Safe
Drinking Water Act,7 1 the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976,11 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,'7 all provide legal foundations for several state programs that attempt to meet federal
68. Id. at 1637.
69. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017642 (1988)).
70. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511376 (1988)). The act made major amendments to existing water quality laws that included
establishment of a permit system for point discharges: the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System.
71. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f
to 300j-11(1988)).
72. Pub. L. No. 94-580. 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6939 (1988)).
73. Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
titles 26, 33, 42, and 69 U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
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mandates as well as achieve state constitutional requirements.
Montana's law in these areas,74 along with state agency attainment
of primary responsibility for implementing the federal mandates, is
significant. Moreover, in some instances, state regulation extends
beyond federal mandates addressing issues of unique significance.75
Yet, in other areas, Montana has been reluctant to extend such
regulation beyond federal minimum requirements. 7 These programs deserve thorough discussion, but a clear assessment of Montana's aggressiveness in implementing the constitutional directives
is difficult given the overlying federal direction.
In other areas, the state has moved on its own, offering insight
on how Montanans are independently applying the constitution to
current problems. These initiatives, as illustrated below, echo the
continuing interplay between efforts to enhance public or community values and efforts to protect private property interests.
A.

Implementation of the Montana Environmental Policy Act

Since the 1972 convention, the Montana Environmental Policy
Act (MEPA) has served as the principal basis for ensuring comprehensive environmental review of state actions.7 7 Passed in
1971-one year before the Constitutional Convention-MEPA declares an environmental policy that served as a model for the convention delegates:
[Ilt is the continuing policy of the state of Montana, in cooperation with the federal government and local governments and
other concerned public and private organizations, to use all prac74. Montana's air-quality laws are codified at MONT. CODE ANN. Title 75, chapter 2
(1989); its water quality laws are codified at MONT. CODE ANN. Title 75, chapter 5 (1989); its
hazardous waste management laws are codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-401 to -451
(1989); and its CERCLA implementation laws are codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-601
to -628 (1989).
75. Examples include: (1) Montana's regulation of open burning (see ADMIN. R. MONT.
16.8.1301-16.8-1308 (1989); (2) Montana's establishment of a nondegradation policy for
Montana's water sources (see MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-303 (1989)); (3) Montana's authorization of county ordinances prohibiting the sale and distribution of phosphorus compounds
(see MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-7-411 (1989)); and (4) the Comprehensive Environmental
Cleanup and Responsibility Act, which enables state cleanup of hazardous waste at sites not
on the federal "Superfund" National Priority List (see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-701 to 724 (1989)).
76. Examples include: (1) MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-405 (1989), which states that the
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences "may not adopt rules more restrictive
than those promulgated by the federal government under the [federal] Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976," with some limited exceptions; and (2) ADMIN. R. MONT.
16.8.820 (1989), which lessens the effect of otherwise stricter ambient air quality standards
for contributors of pollutants who exceeded the standards during 1985.
77. 1971 Mont. Laws 238 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-301 to -324 (1989)).
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ticable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can coexist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social,
economic, and other7 8 requirements of present and future generations of Montanans.
Generally, MEPA directs all state agencies to consider environmental attributes and problems in their day-to-day activities and
decisionmaking. 9 Two specific issues demonstrate the values tugof-war associated with MEPA.
1.

The Substantive versus ProceduralDebate

Since the early 1970s, debate has continued over whether
MEPA can be a basis for attaching environmental requirements
that go beyond the regulatory (i.e., permitting or licensing) statute.
The answer is still unclear.
Montana Wilderness Association v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences,8" commonly referred to as Beaver Creek II,
frequently is cited for the proposition that MEPA is only a procedural statute. In that case, the Montana Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the removal of sanitary restrictions for the
proposed Beaver Creek South subdivision in Gallatin County by
the Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences
(DHES) required an environmental impact statement.
In Beaver Creek II, the DHES, according to the plaintiff, did
not comply with MEPA when it failed to conduct and write an
adequate environmental impact statement (EIS) on its proposed
action to issue a certificate under the Sanitation in Subdivisions
Act 8 ' removing the sanitary restrictions on property in Gallatin
County known as the Beaver Creek South subdivision. Prior to issuance of the certificate, the Montana Wilderness Association filed
suit for an injunction with the district court, arguing that the EIS
was inadequate and, therefore, in violation of MEPA.8 2 The district court agreed, triggering an appeal to the supreme court.8 3
In an unusual series of events, the Montana Supreme Court
MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-103(1) (1989).
79. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(1)(b) (1989). The complete subsection is often
78.

overlooked because of the in-depth attention given to subsections (iii)(A)-(E), which set
forth the threshold requirements for environmental impact statements.
80. 171 Mont. 477, 559 P.2d 1157 (1976) [hereinafter Beaver Creek II].
81. 1973 Mont. Laws 509 (codified as amended in MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 76, ch. 4
(1989)).
82. Beaver Creek 11, 171 Mont. at 482-85, 559 P.2d at 1159-60.
83. Id. at 482, 559 P.2d at 1159-60.
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initially affirmed the district court, holding that the EIS was procedurally inadequate because of its failure to consider the full
range of environmental factors required by MEPA.84 However,
about five months later, the court reconsidered its decision and
completely reversed its holding. Moreover, the court held that the
DHES may only consider criteria directly relating to its regulatory
functions under the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act, which includes
sewage, solid waste, and water supply, for example.8 To go beyond
these areas, the court reasoned, was impermissible, because such
Department efforts would conflict with the legislative policy of local control under the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act. The
court also observed that
"[n]owhere in the MEPA is found any
86
regulatory language.
Beaver Creek If has been cited as the basis for a procedural
interpretation of MEPA. That is, MEPA is a process to ensure environmental concerns are considered but which does not require
that a project be modified to minimize environmental impacts.
Condemning the decision, Justice Haswell, in his dissent, stated,
"The decision of the Court today deals a mortal blow to environmental protection in Montana. With one broad sweep of the pen,
the majority has reduced constitutional and statutory protections
to a heap of rubble, ignited by the false issue of local control."8 7
While the merits of this argument can be discussed at length, the
issue has remained unsettled throughout the 1980s, perhaps most
significantly illustrated by a district court decision in 1985. In Cabinet Resource Group v. Department of State Lands,8 8 the court
addressed whether the Montana Department of State Lands could
require mitigation of impacts to wildlife from a proposed hard-rock
mine. Because authority for such mitigation is not specified under
the metal mine reclamation statutes 89-the
permitting statutes-the department was unwilling to attach wildlife mitigation
requirements.9 0 The plaintiffs argued that MEPA provides substantive authority to impose these mitigation requirements, and
84. Id. at 486-516, 559 P.2d at 1161-77 (Haswell, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 485, 559 P.2d at 1161. The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences regulates subdivisions for sanitation purposes under the Sanitation in Subdivisions
Act.
86. Id. at 486, 559 P.2d at 1161.
87. Id. (Haswell, J., dissenting).
88. Cabinet Resource Group v. Department of State Lands, No. 43194 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist. Sept. 29, 1982)(opinion on motions for partial summary judgment) [hereinafter
Cabinet Resource Group].

89.

MONT. CODE ANN.

90.

Cabinet Resource Group, supra note 88, at 6.

tit. 82, ch. 4, pt. 3 (1989).
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the district court endorsed this interpretation."
The Montana Supreme Court never addressed the district
court decision. Moreover, the potential significance of the decision
diminished during the 1980s because of the emergence of MEPA as
a process by which agreements on substance can be reached.
Rather than litigate potential MEPA issues, parties in many instances have re-examined probable project impacts during the
MEPA analysis and reached agreement on mitigation measures
that reduce the adverse impacts of the proposed project. Thus,
both private property objectives and public interest objectives can
be met regardless of the substantive or procedural nature of
MEPA.
2. Review for Significant Effects Arguably Has Substantive
Implications
The most attention-getting aspect of MEPA is its requirement
that any major state action must be reviewed for its effect on the
quality of the human environment.9 2 If the effect is significant, an
EIS is normally required.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, environmental review involved
either preparation of a preliminary environmental review (PER)93
or an EIS if significant effects were anticipated. In the mid-1980s,
the Department of State Lands initiated an expanded PER approach to certain hard-rock mine operations. 4 The expanded PER
was more issue-specific-thereby requiring less time to prepare.
However, the Department of State Lands used the expanded PER
only for mine-permit applications having relatively limited significant effects. Also, the expanded PER did not come under the formal time frames required for an EIS, and the agency rather than
the applicant paid for the expanded PER. 5
This practice, while paralleling certain federal agency practices and having some support under federal case law, evoked concern because it circumvented established channels for pulblic participation through the EIS process. Moreover, the expanded PER
91.

Id.

92.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 75-1-201(1)(b)(iii) (1989).

93. A preliminary environmental review (PER), in theory, was to be used to determine
if an environmental impact statement (EIS) was necessary for any major state action. In
practice, a PER was generally not prepared if the need for an EIS was clear. Thus, PERs
became a vehicle for documenting the absence of significant effects.

94. One of the first expanded PERs was prepared in 1985 by the Department of State
Lands for the KoKa mine in northwestern Montana.
95. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-202, -203 (1989). Fees may be assessed only for preparation of an environmental impact statement.
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was not contemplated under existing MEPA rules. Nonetheless,
the practice was continued in an agency effort to streamline environmental review for hard-rock mine applicants.
In 1985 the Environmental Quality Council (EQC)"I undertook
a three-year effort to develop revised and updated MEPA rules.97
The expanded PER, which is now called a mitigated environmental assessment to conform with federal usage under the National
Environmental Policy Act,98 became a major discussion topic during this period. Public interest groups expressed strong reservations to this shortcut to environmental review and requested specific amendments that would ensure opportunities for public
involvement in the environmental assessment (EA). The EQC itself indicated mixed support for the mitigated EA, with at least
one member expressing reservations. 9
The executive branch agencies supported general mitigated
EA language, pointing out the need for agency discretion in environmental review. 100 However, continued opposition by public interest representatives during formal rulemaking spurred some
change. The agencies, in final amendments, revised the public review requirement for mitigated EAs to require adequate notice and
opportunity for comment and public hearing.101
The evolution of mitigated EAs in Montana illustrates both
private property rights and public interest themes. In its final
form, the mitigated EA rule lessens the harshness of MEPA review
for persons proposing projects with effects that are significant but
which may be mitigated. However, because agencies must adhere
to standards allowing public participation and comment to the
EAs, the public interest objectives of MEPA and the Montana
Constitution are also respected.
96. The Environmental
with the enactment of MEPA.
providing recommendations to
and other environmental laws.
(1989).

Quality Council is a 13-member bipartisan council created
A legislative-branch entity, its duties include overseeing and
the legislature concerning agency implementation of MEPA
See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 5-16-101 to -105, 75-1-301 to -324

97. The EQC effort involved development of "model" rules for consideration by the
executive branch agencies. The agencies made some revisions and adopted the rules in late
1988 and early 1989.
98. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370a
(1988)).
99. Minutes of the Montana Environmental Quality Council 13 (Jan. 29, 1988) (testimony of Thomas M. France, a council member).
100. See Minutes of the Environmental Quality Council 7 (Apr. 8, 1988) (testimony
of Brace Hayden, a council member and advisor to Governor Ted Schwinden on natural
resource issues).
101. See, e.g., ADMIN. R. MONT. 16.2.629(4) (1989). The MEPA rules of the executive
branch agencies are largely identical.
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The Mining Laws

Another regulatory scheme illustrative of the balancing act between the public interest and protection of private property rights
is that covering the mining of precious metals. Clearly Montana's
hard-rock mining heritage, checkered as it is, had a great influence
on the adoption of strong constitutional mandates for a clean and
healthful environment. This heritage also contributed significantly
to the strong provisions of article IX, section 2, requiring that
"[a]ll lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be
reclaimed."' 10
Even more noteworthy was the climate of tension surrounding
the future of mining in Montana-both of coal and of hard-rock
minerals-that existed at the time of the constitutional convention. In the early 1970s, Montana lay poised at the edge of massive
development of her coal resources, which some viewed with great
anticipation of wealth for the state but others viewed with a sense
of impending doom for a cherished way of life. And the Anaconda
Company, with its history of unbridled clout and economic lifeblood for the communities of Butte, Anaconda, and Great Falls,
maintained its dominance of the hard-rock mining industry. 10 3 The
love/hate relationship that characterized Montanans' feelings for
that company, and the industry as a whole, has been well
documented."4
The regulation of coal mining and of hard-rock mining that
implemented the constitutional provisions of article IX took two
divergent paths. Perhaps because the coal industry had less historical and political influence, and because the extent of projected
coal development alarmed even its boosters, the legislature treated
the coal industry more harshly than it had treated the Anaconda
Company. The "Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act" (Strip Mine Act), adopted by the legislature in 1973,
broke new ground by requiring that coal-mined land be reclaimed
to its original contours, with native vegetative species, and to its
original purposes. 10 5 The Strip Mine Act was the first specific response to the new constitutional mandates on the environment,
102.

MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2.

103.

MONTANANS FOR QUALITY TELEVISION,

K. Ross Toole's Montana, pt. V (1985)

(available on video cassette).
104.

See MALONE & ROEDER, MONTANA: A HISTORY OF Two CENTURIES (1976), How-

ARD, MONTANA: HIGH, WIDE AND HANDSOME

(1959).
105.
(1989)).

(1943);

TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON LAND

1973 Mont. Laws 325 (codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 42, pt. 2
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and it represented a forceful response indeed. The law contained
unprecedented and specific language stating that, in fact, certain
areas of the state should not be mined, for example, because of
their "ecological fragility." The Strip Mine Act later became a
model for the federal "Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (SMCRA)."'' 0 Although its provisions were amended
in 1979 to conform to SMCRA, and again in 1981 to soften the
requirement for revegetation as well as to eliminate the "ecological
fragility" sections, the Strip Mine Act still represents one of the
cornerstones of the legislature's early commitment to stringent implementation of the new constitution.
The regulation of hard-rock mining, on the other hand, has
taken a more meandering route toward implementation of the constitution. The Hard Rock Mining Reclamation Act (Hard Rock
Act), which still governs the permitting of hard-rock mines in
Montana, was actually enacted in 1971.107 Perhaps because the attention of the legislature was more focused on coal, and also because the Hard Rock Act was developed before enactment of the
new constitution, the Hard Rock Act remains less restrictive than
the coal strip- mine laws. While the Hard Rock Act requires the
reclamation of disturbed lands for large mines, it contains significant exemptions for "small-miners" who operate on less than five
acres, remove less than 36,500 tons of earth a year, and meet certain other requirements.1 08 "Small miners" are not required to reclaim the land they mine; until late 1989 a small miner was required only to file an affidavit promising not to pollute state waters
and to protect human and animal life around the mine.
Although the 1989 Legislature adopted new reclamation and
bonding requirements for small-miners who engage in placer or
dredge mining, or who use cyanide in their operations, 09 several
commentators have contended that the small-miner exclusion represents a significant departure from the constitutional provisions
requiring the reclamation of all lands disturbed by the taking of
natural resources."' This contention has yet to be tested in court,
however.
106. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445-532 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§
1201-1328 (1988)).
107. 1971 Mont. Laws 252 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-301 to -362 (1989)).
108. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-4-303(14), -305 (1989).
109. The 1989 Montana Legislature passed two laws that present additional requirements for small miners engaged in placer mining or in using cyanide chemicals. See 1989
Mont. Laws 346-47.
110. See, e.g., Minutes of the House Natural Resources Committee 6 (Feb. 17, 1989)
(testimony of Jim Jensen, representing the Montana Environmental Information Center).
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The Hard Rock Act also contains strict confidentiality provisions that are missing from the Stip Mine Act, reflecting both the
differences in the hard-rock and coal markets and the strong hardrock mining heritage that has historically allowed mining companies to keep their processes and plans secret. Over the years, these
confidentiality provisions have often been roadblocks to citizens
trying to gain information about proposed or actual mines. However, the mining industry has continued to convince the legislature
that confidentiality is necessary for the industry to maintain its
competitive edge, both within the industry and in the international
market. Some citizens have argued that these confidentiality provisions in fact violate other aspects of the Montana Constitution
governing a citizen's right to know.111 To date their arguments
have not prevailed.
Until very recently no application for a permit to mine under
the Hard Rock Act has been denied. This is significant because the
law does not prohibit on mining in certain environmentally sensitive areas, unlike the Strip Mine Act. For many years, the 1971
Hard Rock Act remained essentially unchanged from its pre-constitutional enactment in 1971. However, in recent years, the legislature has tightened the law to reflect the markedly increased activity in the hard-rock arena and the potentially disruptive
techniques for remining tailings and milling ores. Most of these additional restrictions were developed in cooperation with the mining
industry and with its support.
All in all, the history of the laws regulating the hard-rock mining industry reflects a desire on the part of Montanans to hold on
to the colorful and feisty mining heritage that characterizes the
state while attempting to ensure that the abuses of that heritage
are not revisited on the environment. The Upper Clark Fork River,
the nation's largest Superfund site and a result of mining abuses of
the past, serves as an ever-present reminder of the need for continued vigilance.
C. The 1973 Water Use Act and Subsequent Revisions
Water is an essential and precious resource for Montanans.
Because of its fundamental value, the strong and continuing legislative response to the major 1972 constitutional expansion of the
water-rights section should not be startling.
Legislative activity began only one year after the convention
111.

MONT. CONST. art.

II, § 9.
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with the passage of the Montana Water Use Act." 2 This new law
initiated several new and major undertakings, including: 1) a
water-rights adjudication process; 2) an administrative-permit system as the means of obtaining a post-July 1, 1973 water right; and
3) a water-reservation system that enables governments to reserve
water for existing and future beneficial uses, including those requiring instream flows. 113
These undertakings mark the beginning of a stimulating period of innovations in water policy-a period dotted with changes
accommodating both private property values and public values. All
were driven by a common desire to ensure protections from downstream threats.
1.

The Water-Rights Adjudication

The water-rights adjudication established under the 1973
Water Use Act 1 directly addressed the declaration in article IX,
section 3(3), confirming all existing rights. This system marked the
first extensive effort to quantify and place into common records all
pre-1973 water rights in Montana. Yet, by 1977, it had not resulted
in any decrees. Moreover, Ted J. Doney, the director of the Montana Department of Natural Resources, estimated that the entire
adjudication would "take over 100 years to complete""15 if funding
continued at 1977 levels. Therefore, House Joint Resolution No.
81, adopted by the 1977 Legislature, authorized a special interim
committee, later named the Subcommittee on Water Rights, to
study the issue. The Subcommittee's recommendations,'" 6 accepted
by the 1979 Legislature, included: (1) substantial revisions to the
adjudication process, including the creation of a system of water
courts; and (2) explicit direction to expedite and facilitate the ad7
judication of existing water rights."
Federal and state courts have upheld the new process as adequate on its face."" However, questions concerning both the structure and operation of Montana's adjudication process have generated considerable controversy. In mid-1985, for example, litigation
112. 1973 Mont. Laws 452 (codified as amended at MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-101 to 807 (1989)).
113. Id. at H 1 to -25.
114. Id. at §§ 6 to -15.
115. H.J.R. No. 81, 45th Leg. (1977), reprintedin 1977 Mont. Laws Appendix at 2120.
116. See generally SU3COMMITTEE ON WATER RIGHTS, DETERMINATION OF EXISTING
WATER RIGHTS (1978).
117. 1979 Mont. Laws 697.
118. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 463 (1983); State ex. rel. Greely v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 219 Mont. 76, 712 P.2d 754 (1985).
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brought by the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks
resulted in a stipulated agreement among various parties, including
the Montana Water Courts and the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). More recently, the Montana Supreme Court has issued three opinions concerning the adjudication process,"" the most controversial one finding that the
Supreme Court itself-not the DNRC or the Water Courts-has
authority to adopt rules concerning the DNRC's water-rights ver120
ification functions.

This activity led .to a major legislative re-examination of the
adjudication process in 1988 involving an independent assessment
of the process. 21 The legislative finding was a general vote of confidence for the existing process, although a significant number of
bills modifying it were proposed and, after substantial amendments, enacted by the legislature. 2 2 Nonetheless, concerns remain
about the ability of the process to fulfill the federal McCarran
Amendment 23 as well as state and federal constitutional
requirements.' 2 '
The practical aspect of this controversy is disturbing.
Nearly everyone agrees that more certainty concerning water rights
is in Montana's best interest. But, if the legal concerns have merit,
our existing system may be incapable of delivering accurate or defensible water rights.
2.

Water Permitting System

The water permitting system provided a new institutional
mechanism for cataloguing post-July 1, 1973, water uses while also
protecting existing water rights. When enacted in 1973, an applicant could obtain a permit under the following conditions: (a) "un119. In re Department of Natural Resources & Conservation,226 Mont. 221, 740 P.2d
1096 (1985); McDonald v. State, 220 Mont. 519, 722 P.2d 598 (1986); and In re Sage Creek
Drainage Area, 234 Mont. 243, 763 P.2d 644 (1988).
120. In re Department of Natural Resources & Conservation, 226 Mont. at 236, 740
P.2d at 1105.
121. The legislature allocated $75,000 to the Water Policy Committee for this purpose.
A Colorado law firm was hired to evaluate the process and report to the committee. See
Saunders, Snyder, Ross & Dickson, P.C., Report to the Water Policy Committee on the
Water Rights Adjudication Process (Oct. 1988).
122. See 1989 Mont. Laws 426, 586, 604, 605. The laws were the outgrowth of the
Water Policy Committee's evaluation of the water rights adjudication process.
123. Under the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. 666 (1988), states may determine
federal and Indian water rights in a general stream adjudication. Subsequent litigation has
reinforced this authority if the state process is adequate. See, e.g., supra note 118.
124. See, e.g., Minutes of the Water Policy Committee 10, Attachment A (Sept. 8,
1989) (testimony of Richard Aldrich, Field Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior).
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appropriated waters" are "in the source of supply"; (b) "the
[water] rights of a prior appropriator will not be adversely affected"; (c) "the proposed means of diversion or construction are
adequate"; (d) "the use of water is a beneficial use"; and (e) "the
proposed use will not interfere unreasonably with other planned
[water] uses or developments for which a permit has been issued or
12 5
for which water has been reserved.
As the 1980s approached, threats of increased water demands
from energy development, both in- and out-of-state, prompted
bans on water exports and coal-slurry uses. Both of these bans
were questioned constitutionally. 2 Thus, in 1983, the Montana
Legislature directed an interim study committee-the Select Committee on Water Marketing-to examine and possibly revamp
Montana's water law to ensure adequate protections were in place
1 27
and to examine potentials for water marketing.
Other developments also influenced events during this period.
First, in 1982, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska statute that severely restricted interstate water transfers.1 28
However, the Court left some opportunity for state regulation of
water transfers, particularly if the regulation is based on conservation grounds. During the same period, South Dakota agreed to sell
water from the Oahe Reservoir, a Missouri river mainstem reservoir in central South Dakota, to Energy Transportation Systems,
Inc. (ETSI) for coal-slurry purposes. This agreement evoked both
concern and interest in potentials for marketing water in Montana.
Shortly thereafter, in Montana, the Montana Supreme Court delivered two stream-access opinions, commonly referred to as Curran
and Hildreth,29 which documented a public trust in water.
Strongly influenced by these events, the Select Committee responded by producing House Bill 680,130 which promoted both
public interest and private property values. To protect Montana
water users from out-of-state water interests, for example, the
committee installed new public interest criteria in Montana's per125. 1973 Mont. Laws 452, § 21. These criteria are now reflected in MONT. CODE ANN.
85- 2 -311(1)(a)-(e) (1989). Similar criteria are inserted in MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402
(1989), the change in appropriation right statute.
126. SELECT COMMITTEE ON WATER MARKETING, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
WATER MARKETING TO THE 49TH LEGISLATURE, V-9 to V-13 (1985).
127. 1983 Mont. Laws 706, § 4.
128. Sporhase v. State ex. rel. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
129. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163
(1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d 1088
(1984). A subsequent and related case is Galt v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks,
225 Mont. 142, 731 P.2d 912 (1987).
130. The bill, with minor amendments, was enacted in 1985 Mont. Laws 573.

§

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1990

23

Montana Law Review, Vol. 51 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 12

434

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

mitting and change in appropriation rights statute that apply to
any proposed out-of-state water use. The criteria, which were
drafted to meet the constitutional concerns expressed in Sporhase
v. State ex. rel. Nebraska,13 1 require that the proposed use not be
contrary to water conservation in Montana and not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare of the citizens of the State of
Montana."3 2
In addition, only the DNRC may appropriate water for interbasin transport or in instances in which the appropriation would
result in the consumption of "4,000 acre-feet a year" and "5.5 cubic feet" of water per second.1 33 The DNRC may then lease the
water to private parties although the DNRC may not lease more
than an aggregate of "50,000 acre-feet" of water without further
legislative approval.1 3 Environmental review under MEPA and
possibly the Major Facility Siting Act is also required. 13 5
The new public-interest criteria and leasing program addressed both private and public values. In addition, several watermanagement directives were integrated into House Bill 680 to promote a long-term water policy that keeps Montana's house in order. These directives included an expedited water reservation effort, a more active state water plan, a healthy water research
program, and a comprehensive water data system. 3 '
Why did this major bill pass virtually unanimously? The answer may be that once again a common goal-protection from
downstream threats-was achieved. In addition, the public protections are inserted in places less likely to infringe on private property interests. Most notably, the protections generally do not affect
smaller, instate water transactions whether they are by permit or
change in appropriation right. While the threshold for public-interest review was lowered from 10,000 acre-feet or 15 cubic feet per
second to 4,000 acre-feet and 5.5 cubic feet per second, the new
value still exempts the vast majority of Montana's water rights.
3.

The Water-Reservation System

Montana's water-reservation statute'3 7 allows governments to
131. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
132. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-311(3), -402(5) (1989).
133. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-310 (1989). Six basins covering the State of Montana are
named for purposes of the interstate transfer restriction.
134. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-141(4) (1989).
135. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-141(6) (1989).
136. These concerns were also addressed by the Select Committee's bill. See 1985
Mont. Laws 573, §§ 17, 18, 20.
137. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1989).
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reserve water for existing or future beneficial uses. 138 While extensive technical amendments have been made since 1973, the overall
goal of the statute-to put Montana in a position to defend future
uses of water from present downstream threats-remains intact.
Under this statute, water reservations have been established in the
Yellowstone river basin and are being developed for the Clark
Fork, Upper Missouri, and Lower Missouri river basins.
Since 1973, the water-reservation statute has been the principal tool for establishing possible instream-flow entitlements. From
an instream-flow perspective, the statute has a glaring weakness; it
provides very junior priority dates. A series of droughts in the
1980s pointed to the need for early priority dates if critical stream
flows are to be maintained.
The reality of the 1988 drought-one of the worst ever-was
further fueled by the decision in In re Dearborn Drainage Area,
commonly referred to as the Bean Lake decision.13 9 In Bean Lake,
the Montana Supreme Court held what many recreationists
feared-that to establish a pre-July 1, 1973, water right the waterright holder must have made a diversion (unless the legislature
specifically provides otherwise, as illustrated by legislative authorization of "Murphy rights" on certain blue-ribbon trout streams).1 40
The same logic may limit potentials for obtaining an instream
right with a pre-July 1, 1973 priority date through a change in appropriation right proceeding.
While the courts were processing Bean Lake, the DNRC examined instream-flow protection strategies in its state water- planning process.14 ' That study resulted in submittal of a water- leasing bill (House Bill 707) to the Montana Legislature."" The bill
proposed to authorize the leasing of pre-July 1, 1973, appropriation
rights by one entity: the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife,
and Parks. 43 In an additional effort to calm fears of water-right
138. Id. Existing uses generally involve instream beneficial uses.
139. In re Dearborn Drainage Area, 234 Mont. 331, 766 P.2d 228 (1988) (known as the
Bean Lake decision).
140. "Murphy rights" were a result of legislation authorizing the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks to establish instream rights on blue ribbon trout streams.
See 1969 Mont. Laws 345 (the Murphy Rights statute was codified as REv. CODES MONT. §
89-801 (Supp. 1969)). With passage of the 1973 Water Use Act, 1973 Mont. Laws 452, opportunity for establishing Murphy rights was extinguished by repeal of the statute.
141. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-203 (1989). The state water planning process involves
examination of topics relevant to Montana's water management. Instream flow protection
was discussed during the 1987-1988 planning cycle, and a water leasing bill was
recommended.
142. H.B. 707, 51st Leg., § 4 (1989) (introduced bill).
143. Id. at § 4.
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holders, the bill proposed that leasing occur in no more than ten
stream reaches and that leases have a maximum duration of ten
years.""
Although the House of Representatives passed the water-leasing bill, it was stalled in the Senate, largely by agricultural interests fearful of the threats associated with competing instream
rights. 14 5 After apparent defeat on the Senate floor, instream-flow
advocates threatened to sue based on the already-articulated public-trust doctrine. Then, in an eleventh-hour move, spurred by
moderate agriculture interests, the Senate reconsidered a revised
bill. In a matter of minutes, both the Senate and House passed the
bill.
The resulting law illustrates how tangled the mixing of private
property values and public interest values can become. 14 6 Montana
now allows the leasing of pre-July 1, 1973 water rights for instream
flows. But the protections for private property values are numerous. For example, the act and any lease entered into under the act
terminate in four years; the number of stream reaches where leasing may occur has been reduced to five; and Fish and Game Commission approval is required for any leasing by the Department of
Fish Wildlife and Parks.
Skeptics might question whether Montana is truly implementing public values into its prior-appropriation laws. The debates
that characterized the 1989 Legislature certainly illustrate the
strong value dichotomies existent in the water arena when common
goals do not exist. Instead of presenting a unified front against
downstream threats, these interests faced off on the use of critical,
scarce water supplies in Montana. This issue remains ripe for a
fundamental debate on the strength of article IX, section 3(3), the
in Galt v.
source of Montana's public-trust doctrine suggested
1 7
Parks.
and
Wildlife
Fish,
of
Montana Department
The three undertakings initiated in 1973-the water rights adjudication process, the permitting process, and the water- reservations process-have all worked to protect both private and public
144. Id. at § 5.
145. See, e.g., Minutes of the Senate Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation Committee 9, exhibit 15 (Mar. 15, 1989) (testimony of Ronald F. Waterman, representing the Montana Stockgrowers' Association, the Montana Cattlemen's Association, and the Montana Association of State Grazing Districts).
146. 1989 Mont. Laws 658. This session law is reflected in the temporary sections of
Montana Code Annotated 85-2-402, 404, 436, 437 (1989).
147. 225 Mont. 142, 731 P.2d 912 (1987). Some commentators also suggest extra-constitutional origins for the public-trust doctrine. See, e.g., Thorson, Brown, & Desmond,
Forging Public Rights in Montana's Waters, 6 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1985).
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values in water. Admittedly, the extent to which these processes
have created an adequate balance of private and public values
might be debated. Nonetheless, the fact that public values are
firmly reflected in Montana's present prior- appropriation laws is
significant, because the water-rights arena is where private property rights are asserted most strongly.
D. Land Use Laws
Although Montana leads several states in many aspects of environmental regulation, particularly that of large-scale resource extraction and major-facility siting, its overall regulation of land-use
practices lags far behind many states. This less restrictive regulatory atmosphere surrounds the subdivision of land as well as many
agricultural and silvicultural practices. Because individuals rather
than the large, corporate, extractive industries engage in many of
these activities, the legislature and regulatory agencies give them
less regulatory scrutiny. Yet their cumulative effect on the environment of Montana often has had greater negative impact than the
sometimes feared "smokestack industries." Many of these impacts
result from hard-to-pinpoint "nonpoint sources" of contamination
and from small but numerous point sources. While some efforts
have been attempted to regulate these activities, they have been
largely ineffective, even counterproductive. Some recent legislative
attempts, however, have yet to be tested either by adequate re148
source monitoring or time.
Montana's laws regulating the subdivision of land illustrate
these assertions. Prior to 1973, legislation had directed the Department of Health to review the water supply and sewage systems for
subdivisions smaller than five acres. 149 Some of Montana's earliest
statutes also contained provisions relating to platting and surveying. Other early provisions gave requirements for monuments and
for dedication of portions of subdivided land for parks and playgrounds. 150 Until 1973, however, no legislation existed in Montana
that purported to deal either systematically or comprehensively
with the adverse environmental and social effects of subdivision
development.""
Following the adoption of the 1972 Constitution, the legislature enacted the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act 52 to regu148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See 1989 Mont. Laws 423, 668.
1967 Mont. Laws 197, §§ 148-152.
REV. CODES MONT. tit. 11, ch. 6 (1947).
Goetz, Recent Developments in Land Use Law, 38 MONT. L. REV. 97, 99 (1977).
1973 Mont. Laws 500 (currently the Subdivision and Platting Act is codified at
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late subdivisions and "require development [of land] in harmony
with the natural environment." s Applying to land divided into
parcels of ten or fewer acres, the act's innovations included requiring an environmental assessment and local-government review and
approval prior to subdividing land. In addition, the act required all
local governments to adopt subdivision regulations that met or exceeded model state regulations.
The 1973 Legislature correspondingly adopted a more comprehensive approach to the Department of Health and Environmental
Sciences' review of subdivisions, thus establishing the dual system
of subdivision regulation that still exists today. The Sanitation in
Subdivisions Act was expanded to protect the quality of water "for
other factors affecting public health and the quality of water for
uses relating to agriculture, industry, recreation, and wildlife" and
to include the regulation of solid-waste disposal as well.154
In 1974 and 1975, the legislature amended the Subdivision and
Platting Act and the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act in several important respects. These amendments responded to the fever pitch
of development occurring in many Montana valleys and pristine
areas causing significant concern among policy makers.155 Although
that alarm was not strong enough to convince the legislature to
enact the comprehensive land-use law introduced by the Environmental Quality Council in 1975, fierce legislative battles and painstaking compromise led to what conservationists believed were significant strengthening amendments to the subdivision laws. These
included the expansion of the laws to cover parcels of less than 20
acres, adoption of eight public- interest criteria for use by local
governments in evaluating subdivisions, and the extension of Department of Health and Environmental Sciences authority over divisions of land previously created through the use of occasional
sale or family- conveyance exemptions.
Both the Subdivision and Platting Act and the Sanitation in
Subdivisions Act have undergone relatively minor changes since
" But the lofty purposes
1975.156
and high-minded goals of those

acts, which so closely resemble the themes running through the
MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 76, ch. 3, pt. 1 (1989)).

153.

154.
155.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-102 (1989).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-4-104 (1989).
MONTANA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL,

LAND USE

POLICY STUDY, 9-17

(1974).
156. SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUBDIVISION LAWS, MONTANA'S SUBDIVISION LAWS: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS (1978); MONTANA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT TENTH

EDITION: RESEARCH TOPICS 15-32 (1987). Both of these documents provide a comprehensive
history and analysis of Montana's subdivision laws.
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1972 environmental provisions of the constitution, have been woefully unrealized. Several legislative studies, executive- branch critiques, public-interest-group exposes, law-review articles, and other
treatises have documented the ineffectiveness of Montana's subdivision laws. In fact, many commentators assert that the Subdivision and Platting Act has had the exact opposite effect of its intended purposes. By creating a process that is vague, uncertain,
costly, and tedious for developers, the legislature and implementing local government officials unwittingly encouraged subdividers
to develop elaborate schemes to evade the law. As a result, a significant majority of subdivisions never receive local-government review. The vast numbers of twenty-acre parcels are good for little
more than growing weeds, and unplanned subdivisions stretch
communities to provide services.
Although the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act arguably has
been more effective, because it covers those parcels under twenty
acres in size that are exempt from the Subdivision and Platting
Act (e.g. the occasional sale and family conveyance), several critics
have charged that it fails to take into account the cumulative effect
of subdivisions in an area that is environmentally sensitive or is
experiencing rapid economic growth. These subdivisions considered by themselves may be environmentally sound, but when evaluated for their cumulative effect on an ecological system, may be
devastating. This trend has been most acutely evidenced in the
Flathead Basin. Critics, and even the Department of Health and
Environmental Sciences, also have noted that adequate enforcement of the law is difficult given limited personnel and enforcement remedies.
Since enactment of the subdivision acts, nearly every legislative session has been a battle ground for efforts to modify the subdivision laws, both to make them less restrictive and to close perceived loopholes. After sixteen years, a political and environmental
stalemate reigns in the arena of subdivision regulation.
The legislature came closest to resolving this deadlock in 1987
with the introduction of House Bill 809. This bill represented the
best efforts of the Environmental Quality Council and numerous
interested and affected individuals and groups who had labored
over two years to develop a comprehensive evaluation and reworking of Montana's subdivision laws. Introduced with high hopes for
success, House Bill 809 provided review for all divisions of land
while attempting to eliminate the feared subjectivity of "applause
meter" effects of the Subdivision and Platting Act. Although the
bill represented painstaking efforts to achieve consensus, it was de-
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feated through the efforts of several interest groups who adhered
to the ever-present political axiom that the enemy that is known is
preferable to the perceived enemy that is unknown. In the 1989
session and until recently, efforts to improve Montana's subdivi7
1
sion laws have been largely abandoned.

5

Regulation of forest practices mirrors the disappointing record
of subdivision regulation. However, some recent legislative efforts
in the forest-practices arena may bear fruit.' 58 In addition, recent
legislative initiatives related to the control of the unwise use of
pesticides and fertilizers in agriculture may decrease pollution in
this area, too, if adequate resources are devoted to their
implementation.
Lack of public awareness of the environmental threats posed
by many small, non-point polluters plus a lack of individual and
corporate environmental commitment to a clean and healthful environment have resulted in a failure of today's reality to match
1972's expectations in these areas particularly. The reasons for this
more disappointing record again reflect the competing values of
Montanans, and the sense that use and abuse of Montana's more
renewable resources (e.g. our soil and our watersheds) through subdivision, silviculture, and agriculture do not constitute the threat
that is perceived from extractive industries. But in reality, cumulative overuse of these renewable resources may lead to an effective
"mining" of them.
E. Summary of Post-ConstitutionalTrends
The cursory review given in this presentation to the post-constitutional enactment and interpretation of four areas of environmental policy leads to several observations for Montana's future.
While the people of Montana, through their elected representatives, have largely heeded the warnings of the likes of K. Ross
Toole and others, who exhorted them to beware of the modern
counterparts to Marcus Daly and William Clark, they have been
less willing to be wary of the effects of their own actions on the
environment. Although the record on MEPA, mining regulation,
157. An estimated 31,000 gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel leaked from underground
storage tanks associated with unregulated development on the property of the Church Universal and Triumphant in Park County. Dennison, CUT Fuel Leak Estimated at 31,000
Gallons, Missoulian, Apr. 17, 1990, at 1, col. 5. This leak and associated development by the
Church Universal and Triumphant and its members have stimulated revived interest in reforming Montana's subdivision laws.
158. For a comprehensive review of forest practices regulation, see the ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY COUNCIL, HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION

(Dec. 1988).
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water rights, and land use is mixed, on balance, laws now largely
regulate the activities of large corporations engaged in resource extraction. Therefore, environmental regulation of large-scale polluters more closely fulfills the 1972 constitutional mandates of preserving a clean and healthful environment for the large rather than
smaller polluters. The remaining sections of this paper will examine where these trends take us and what is necessary to realize
fully Montana's constitutional goals.
IV.

WHAT DO THESE TRENDS SUGGEST AS NEXT STEPS?

It is probably too early to tell fully whether Montana has
made reasonable progress in implementing the environmental directives established by the 1972 convention. Certainly, additional
institutional efforts are needed to ensure that Montana's environment is clean and healthful for future generations. In particular,
our efforts at addressing cumulative effects-as discussed in the
section on land use-are unimpressive. 59 Moreover, a national
trend toward pollution prevention appears about to emerge. 60 Like
other states, Montana has focused on controlling rather than
preventing pollution and needs to look more at the front end of the
pollution stream.
However, these positive initiatives may be difficult to realize
without a stronger citizen commitment. As stressed earlier, the
1972 Constitution directed the state and each person to work to
maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment-not just
the large extractive industries.
A. Encourage Actions That Prevent Rather Than React to
Pollution
Montana's post-convention history is replete with efforts to
remedy or respond to pollution. Evidencing the "response" approach to environmental degradation, the 1989 Legislature enacted
a bill strengthening Montana's mini-Superfund law.' 6 ' This law facilitates state cleanup of hazardous-waste sites the federal
159. Another recent example concerns oil and gas development along the North Fork
of the Flathead River. A recent Montana Supreme Court decision documents the need for
careful thought in evaluating potential cumulative effects of oil and gas development. North
Fork Preservation Ass'n v. Department of State Lands, Mont. -,
778 P.2d 862 (1989).
160. See Reilly, Pollution Prevention: An Environmental Goal for the 90s, EPA JOURNAL Jan./Feb. 1990, at 4; Commoner, A Reporter At Large (The Environment, THE NEW
YORKER, June 15, 1987, at 46-71; and Kriz, An Ounce of Prevention, NAT'L JOURNAL, Aug.
19, 1989, at 2093.
161. 1989 Mont. Laws 709.
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Superfund program fails to address. Bills authorizing a petroleumtank-cleanup fund for underground-storage-tank leaks1 62 and a bill
funding several cleanup projects from state grant programs 63 are
also indicative of the legislature's "responding" to rather than attempting to prevent pollution.
Unfortunately, our post-convention history evidences limited
efforts at preventing-as opposed to controlling-pollution. For
example, recycling bills and initiatives have failed repeatedly as
solid- and hazardous-waste production continues to climb.1 6 ' In addition, increasing pollution of our waters remains a significant
problem, and maintenance of reasonable air quality is a growing
concern.
Nonetheless, on some environmental fronts Montana is anticipating rather than reacting to problems. The recent enactment of
the Agricultural Chemical Groundwater Protection Act is one example.1 65 By initiating groundwater monitoring and requiring management plans for several agricultural chemicals, Montana will finally be addressing what may become a serious problem
throughout the state. The benefits of this approach are both economic and environmental. Groundwater is an extremely valuable
resource for virtually every economic activity and, once polluted, it
is extremely costly to either restore its quality or find alternative
supplies. Thus, it makes sense to prevent its contamination, regardless of perspective or values.
Preventive approaches could have similar benefits in other areas. By preventing pollution of our surface waters and destruction
of our watersheds, long-term (and sometimes short-term) benefits
may accrue for citizens from all perspectives.
B.

Consider Cumulative Impacts in Making Environmental
Decisions

Montana's environmental laws in virtually every area allow
some exemption for the smaller polluter, developer, or user. In
many instances, the exemptions are provided for good reasons.
When the impacts of several exempted activities are added together, however, the consequences can be negative. In some areas,
tools are available to address cumulative impacts. For example,
162. 1989 Mont. Laws 384.
163. H.B. 775, 51st Leg. (1989). An appropriations bill provided funding for several
projects from the Reclamation and Development Grants Program.
164. Examples include: Mont. Initiative 87 (1980), Mont. Initiative 113 (1988), S.B. 69,
45th Leg. (1977), H.B. 790, 46th Leg. (1979), and H.B. 899, 49th Leg. (1985).
165. 1989 Mont. Laws 668.
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water may be closed to additional appropriation in highly appropriated basins or subbasins.' 6 Similarly, under Montana's airquality laws, additional emissions may be precluded or severely restricted if ambient-air standards would be exceeded in an airshed. 167 At the local-government level, cities and counties can address certain cumulative impacts through zoning and by
developing master plans for subdivisions."6 8 However, local citizens
have often resisted exercise of these tools.
In a general context, projects reviewed under the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) also undergo an examination for
known cumulative impacts. As stated in the MEPA rules:
'Cumulative impact' means the collective impacts on the human
environment of the proposed action when considered in conjunction with other past and present actions related to the proposed
action by location or generic type. Related future actions must
also be considered when these actions are under concurrent consideration by any state agency through pre-impact statement
studies, separate impact statement evaluation, or permit processing procedures.169
The mitigated environmental assessment must consider cumulative
impacts to the extent necessary to determine the significance and
complexity of the proposed action and to mitigate the significant
effects.170 The environmental impact statement must contain discussion of cumulative impacts.17 ' The difficulty lies in how to apply
this cumulative analysis to the project decision. While MEPA rules
require consideration of cumulative impacts as a guide in decisionmaking, the rules do not necessarily require mitigation for cumulative impacts.7 2 Ideally, the result is mitigation of the cumulative
impact in a manner agreeable to the developer, regulator, and affected parties.
Thus, Montana law contains certain limited tools for addressing cumulative impacts. Too often, however, the tools are used
only when crisis is reached. In other instances, tools are not added
until after the crisis. 173 Certainly fine-tuning would be helpful and,
166.
167.
168.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-319 (1989).
ADMIN. R. MONT. tit. 16, ch. 8, subch. 8 (1989).
See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 76 ch. 2, pts. 2 & 3 (1989); MONT CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-606

(1989).

169. See e.g., ADMIN. R. MONT. 16.2.625(7) (1989).
170. See e.g., ADMIN. R. MONT. 16.2.628 (1989).
171. See e.g., ADMIN. R. MONT. 16.2.632 (1989).
172. At issue is the extent to which MEPA may be used as the basis for substantive
requirements on the project.
173. Some commentators would assert agricultural chemicals and groundwater as an
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in some instances, a comprehensive advance look might help determine what new tools are desirable.
Nonetheless, as the concluding section will make clear,
Montanans must be ready and willing to implement curbs and restrictions on previously acceptable activity. Tools without the commitment to use them are of little use.
C. Inspire a Realization of the "People Duty" in the
Constitution
This article has evaluated how Montana's institutions have responded to the environmental provisions of Montana's constitution. But perhaps more fundamentally, the people of Montana
must evaluate their individual and collective response to those provisions. In the preamble, the declaration of rights, and article IX,
the people's duty, along with their corresponding rights, is highlighted. That duty is more obvious in the declaration of rights and
in article IX. For example, the declaration of rights recognizes the
"corresponding responsibilities" of "[a]ll persons" to the enjoyment of the right "to a clean and healthful environment. ' 174 Similarly, article IX requires that "[t]he state and each person shall
maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment . . .for
present and future generations.' 1 75 While the courts, the legislature, and executive agencies must institutionally respond to the
environmental mandates of the constitution, the constitution calls
out the people to respond as well. The will and commitment of the
people in regard to the environment and the constitution must
then translate into the political will necessary to respond institutionally to both.
The Montana Constitution is both a legal and a moral document. As Professor Charles Wilkinson has asserted, "constitutions
are far more than interpretations in judicial proceedings. They are
philosophical and moral statements, they embody the state of
mind of a people.' 76 These sorts of statements are heady stuff for
a law-review article, but they are worthy of following up with an
examination of the role the people can play toward implementation of the constitution.
From the perspective of the legislative branch of government,
Montana's political institutions are stretched nearly to the limit in
example of a post-crisis response. See supra, note 165.
174. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
175. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1) (emphasis added).
176. Address by Charles Wilkinson, 29th Montana Wilderness Association Convention
(Dec. 5, 1987) (reprinted in WILD MONTANA (Mar. 1988)).
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responding to the kinds of environmental problems facing the
state. Montana communities face overwhelming financial drains to
more efficiently and safely dispose of solid waste, develop and
maintain safe drinking water and sewage systems, and otherwise
protect the public health under new federal and state regulations
that will be enforced the 1990s. And Montana lags far behind the
national average in personal economic growth. Space and distance-Montana's enemy and asset-make it nearly impossible for
Montana's institutions to respond economically to the environmental challenges ahead. Yet Montana's environmental groups have focused nearly all their efforts on these institutions.
Instead it may be time for those conservationists and for Montana citizens to focus on ourselves. Montanans have always known
an environmental ethic. That ethic is clear in the stories of the first
native American inhabitants, in the literature referenced earlier,
and in the constitution. A person cannot live in Montana without
possessing at least a shred of it. The land that is Montana shapes
it. Redeveloping, refining, internalizing that ethic into a life of
stewardship and connectedness represents the real prospect for full
realization of the constitutional environmental mandates for
Montanans.
Where can Montanans look for guidance in accomplishing this
rather amorphous and lofty call? First, we can look to the wealth
of Montana writers the centennial year celebrated. Struggles to
adapt to a call for a renewed environmental ethic are not new. One
can find an outstanding model in Ivan Doig's Dancing at the Rascal Fair.1 77 The book recounts the story of two friends who come
from Scotland to find a new life in Montana. Robert Burns Barclay
and Angus McCaskill settle in "Two Medicine Country" on the
Rocky Mountain Front to raise sheep and families amid the beautiful and harsh Montana environment. Although the book is primarily a story of the uncertainties of friendship and love, it also
recounts a compelling example of early Montanans' need and
struggle to adapt to the changes and limits to the environment.
When the sheepherders and cattle ranchers of "Scotch Heaven"
are first told of the need to limit the number of animals on the
range, they are dumbfounded and outraged at this attack on the
freedom that brought them to the land. When Stanley Meixell, the
new forest ranger on the scene, tells them that they can use the
land, but not use it to death, these early Montanans are skeptical.
But eventually, most of them accept and respect these limits. The
177.

DOIG,

DANCING AT THE RASCAL FAIR

227-46 (1987).
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successful ones incorporate this reluctantly received concept of
stewardship into their daily lives.
In addition, Montanans can look to the words and actions of
early conservationists. The likes of John Muir, Aldo Leopold, Bob
Marshall, Theodore Roosevelt, Rachel Carson, and others surely
helped to provide the impetus that eventually led to the adoption
of the strong environmental provisions of the constitutions.1 7 8 Now
they can be rediscovered to help instill the need for personal and
collective changes in our lives that will make the real difference in
whether constitutional mandates are fulfilled.
A recent edition of the EPA Journal provides a good sampling
of the views of national policy-makers and academics on the imperative for an environmental ethic to solve today's almost overwhelming environmental problems.17 9 The words of former EPA
Administrator Lee Thomas sum up the views of many:
We have to recognize that each of us is responsible for the quality
of the environment we all live in, and our personal actions affect
environment[al] quality, for better or worse. This recognition of
individual responsibility must then lead to real changes in individual, family, community, and business behavior. In other words,
our environmental ethic must begin to express itself not only in
federal and state law, but also in subtle but profound changes in
the ways we live our daily lives. 8 '
Perhaps the very first words of the Montana Constitution provide the inspiration for the changes that each Montanan must
make in order to realize fully the promise for a clean and healthful
environment for present and future generations. In the preamble,
the path is clearly marked:
We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet beauty of
our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of our rolling plains, and desiring to improve the quality of life, equality of
opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty for this and future generations do ordain and establish this constitution. 81
These words reflect a spiritual grounding on the part of the delegates to the constitutional convention-a grounding that one also
finds in the early native-American creation stories, in the words
and life of John Muir, and in the words and lives of other early
178. Fox, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT: JOHN MUIR AND His LEGACY
(1985).
179. An Environmental Ethic: Has It Taken Hold? 14 EPA JOURNAL, July/Aug. 1988,
at 1.
180. Thomas, Speaking Frankly, 14 EPA JOURNAL, July/Aug. 1988, at 8-9.
181. MONT. CONST. preamble.
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conservationists. They call for a sense of covenant and compassionate stewardship with the earth and with each living being, including fellow humans. While traditional western religions and more
specifically American Jewish and Christian churches of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth century have done little to
contribute to this need for a spiritual grounding in environmental
stewardship, contemporary theologians, 182 including several notable Montanans, 183 have recently reversed that trend. People seeking to plant the seeds of a spirituality that has existed all along but
became obscured by our contemporary society are rediscovering
some of the early Christian mystics, like Julian of Norwich and
Francis of Assisi, the writings of the nineteenth-century transcendentalists, and Buddhist, Tsaoist, and Essene texts. That spiritual incorporation of stewardship need not be specific to any one
religion or to organized religion at all. Rather, it constitutes a recognition that the states of the natural environments in which people live reflect the state of the human spirit. We all find ourselves
in the environments we deserve, reflecting our values and our
84
beliefs.1
No better testament to the competing values that shape Montana and Montanans, and to the optimism that leads one to believe
that the heady and inspiring words of the constitution can be fulfilled through renewed commitment and spiritual energy, can be
found but in these words by the writer Glenn Law:
In Montana you have to make your own luck. Milk and
honey for the mind don't nourish the body. You can't eat the
scenery. There are only so many ways to make a living here and
few of them result in material wealth. You can't expect much
from a country that plays its hand close and never really shows
all its cards. But when it has a hold on you, you find a way to get
what you need.
Because the climate is harsh, the geography unforgiving, and
the economy often Spartan, it's natural to assume that living in
Montana is hard.
"You gotta be tough to live in Montana."
You hear it time and time again. But the quality of life in
Montana is high and has nothing to do with the standard of living. Just as the thin soil resists domestication, so the space is
comfortable and fertile for the spirit.
182. Prominent theologians who have emphasized environmental stewardship include
Matthew Fox, Wendell Berry, John Cobb, Walter Brueggeman.
183. Montana theologians concerned about environmental stewardship include Wesley
Granville-Michaelson and John Hart.
184.

Meeker, Wisdom and Wilderness, CREATION May-June 1988, at 24.
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The economy has a way of driving out the less committed.
The climate takes its toll on the less captivated. But you don't
have to be tough to live where the air is clean, water pure, and it
will be a cold day in hell before a nuclear reactor moves in next
door. It is comfortable living where your spirit and space can
reach to the horizon or linger along a trout stream. Living in
Montana is easy.
Leaving it is hard.",5

185.

Law, More Than Skin Deep,

MONTANA SPACES,

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/12

supra note 1, at 47.
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